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Abstract
We highlight the importance of ’centrality’ for pricing. Firms characterized
by a more central position in a spatial network are more powerful in terms
of having a stronger impact on their competitors’ prices and on equilibrium
prices. These propositions are derived from a simple theoretical model and
investigated empirically for the retail gasoline market of Vienna, Austria. We
compute a measure of network centrality based on the locations of gasoline
stations in the road network. Results from a spatial autoregressive model
show that prices of gasoline stations are more strongly correlated with prices
of central competitors.
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1 Introduction
In his seminal book The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Chamberlin (1948) refers
to the gasoline market as a prototype for what he calls ‘localized competition’. At the
retail level consumers face transportation (time) costs when switching between gasoline
stations; this introduces spatial product differentiation into an otherwise homogeneous
product market. The importance of spatial product differentiation for market outcomes
is typically investigated in economic models in the tradition of Hotelling (1929), and
Salop (1979). The present paper examines an important dimension of spatial product
differentiation and market power that has been widely ignored by the literature: the
centrality of firms.
Centrality, defined as the extent to which agents are connected to other agents, is
among the most fundamental concepts in the social network literature. In networks of
agents connected via friendship, acquaintanceship, or professional links, researchers found
centrality to be associated with an agent’s social status, power, and influence. In their
description of a widely studied star-shaped network structure, for instance, Brass and
Burkhardt (1992, p. 191) note that “most people would simply look at the diagram and
declare [the central agent] the most powerful”.
Whether firms characterized by a more central position in a network unfolded in space
are more powerful than other firms, however, has not yet been investigated in detail in
economic models. The canonical model of spatial competition formulated by Salop (1979),
for example, assumes that firms are distributed equidistantly (symmetrically) in a circular
market. Per definition, the number of direct competitors (two adjacent neighbors) and
the distances between them – and thus the extent to which firms are interconnected – is
the same for all firms. Firms are different, but they are ‘equally different’ and spatially
homogeneous so the specific location of an individual firm in space is irrelevant. This
simplified assumption reduces the complexity of spatial models considerably but at the
same time precludes an analysis of the importance of spatial heterogeneity and centrality
for firms’ pricing behavior.
The aim of the present paper is to implement the concept of centrality in a simple
theoretical model of spatial product differentiation and empirically investigate its impor-
tance for market power and firms’ pricing behavior. We compare price setting for ‘central’
and ‘remote’ firms in a modified version of Chen and Riordan’s (2007) spokes model.1 By
1A few other studies also deviate from the traditional approach of a linear or circular market space and
consider alternative spatial structures (e.g. Braid, 1989; Fik, 1991). Balasubramanian (1998), among
others, studies a market in which consumers buy either from firms located at a Salop circle or from a
firm located at the center of the circle. However, none of these studies provide empirical evidence of the
importance of centrality for firm pricing and market performance.
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analyzing the retail gasoline market in the metropolitan area of Vienna econometrically,
we provide first empirical evidence of the importance of centrality for pricing.2
A key advantage of the retail gasoline market for this purpose is the fact that the
concept of centrality is based on a definite and easy-to-visualize physical foundation:
Gasoline stations are connected through a network of roads and intersections and can be
characterized by different degrees of centrality (interconnectedness) within this network.
More central stations (a) directly compete with more rivals and (b) are more important
competitors for each of these rivals. Borrowing a measure of network centrality from the
social network literature, we demonstrate that the correlation between gasoline stations’
prices is significantly related to this measure, as predicted by our extended spokes model.
2 The Model
Following Chen and Riordan (2007), we describe the market as a set of N ≥ 2 spokes with
a common core (the market center or the central intersection). Consumers are uniformly
distributed along each spoke with unit density. When consuming at the location of a
specific firm, their net utility equals the utility of the product (s) minus the price charged
(p) and minus transportation costs that depend linearly on the distance consumers have
to travel to the firm of their choice. We set per unit transportation costs to t = 1, without
loss of generality.3 The locations of firms are exogenously given and fixed. In contrast
to Chen and Riordan (2007) we assume that each consumer attributes a value (s) to all
(not only two) firms (varieties) of a local market and we extend their model by allowing
for firms to be located at heterogeneous distances (d) from the center. There is always
exactly one central firm (C) and a finite number of 1 ≤ n ≤ N−1 remote firms (Ri), with
i = 1, ..., n. The central firm is the supplier closest to the market center, thus dC < di,∀i.4
The lengths of the spokes hosting firms are denoted by li and lC , whereas l is the length of
all empty spokes (i.e. spokes not hosting a firm). Firms sell a spatially differentiated but
otherwise homogeneous product (sC = si = s) at constant marginal costs (cC , ci). Fixed
2Empirical research on competition in gasoline markets has mainly focused on the impact of spatial
differentiation on prices and price dispersion (e.g. Netz and Taylor, 2002; Barron et al., 2004), on market
concentration and the role of independent stations (e.g. Pennerstorfer, 2009; Houde, 2012; Pennerstorfer
and Weiss, 2013), as well as on the existence of asymmetries in price adjustment (e.g. Borenstein et al.,
1997; Verlinda, 2008) and Edgeworth price cycles (e.g. Eckert, 2003; Noel, 2007; Lewis, 2012). An
excellent survey of this literature is available in Eckert (2013).
3In the framework of inelastic demand (as assumed below) and differentiated products limit equilibrium
prices are infinite as t→∞. If t→ 0 spatial differentiation (and space itself) becomes irrelevant. With
t = 0 the firm with the lowest marginal cost will serve the entire market at prices slightly below the
marginal costs of the firm with the second lowest marginal costs.
4The concept of centrality in our analysis focuses on firm locations relative to competitors and not to
other factors such as consumer clustering as in Anderson et al. (1997).
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costs are normalized to zero for convenience.
To avoid discontinuities in the demand curve, we assume that the net utility of con-
sumption is strictly positive and that each consumer purchases exactly one unit of the
product per period, i.e. that the market is covered. We further restrict the parameters of
the model so that in equilibrium (a) the market area of C exceeds its own spoke and (b)
all firms sell at least to some consumers. Sufficient conditions for the existence of such an
equilibrium can be stated in terms of upper and lower bounds for differences in marginal
costs between the central and remote firms relative to their locations as well as to the
number of empty spokes. More specifically, (a) and (b) are satisfied if: −9di+d¯i
2
− dC −
2
n
[lC + l (N − n− 1)]+3li− l¯i < cC− 3ci−c¯i2 < 3di−d¯i2 −dC− 2n [lC + l (N − n− 1)]+3li− l¯i,
where d¯i =
∑n
i=1 di/n, c¯i =
∑n
i=1 ci/n, and l¯i =
∑n
i=1 li/n. A detailed discussion of this
restriction is provided in the online appendix. This implies that (a) all consumers loca-
ted at empty spokes buy at the central firm and (b) the central firm competes (shares
common market boundaries) directly with all other (remote) firms in the market, whe-
reas all remote firms directly compete with the central firm only. This stronger degree
of connectedness to competitors associated with the central position of firm C results in
a special role for C in the determination of market prices. Figure 1 illustrates a simple
network for the case of three firms (a central supplier C and n = 2 remote suppliers Ri,
with i = 1, 2) in a market of N = 4 spokes.
[Figure 1]
A marginal consumer located at xi is indifferent between C and Ri if s−pC−(dC+xi) =
s− pi − (di − xi), which can be rearranged to
(1) xi =
pi − pC + di − dC
2
.
Profits (pi) for the central and the remote firms are given by
piC = (pC − cC)
[
n∑
i=1
xi + lC + l(N − n− 1)
]
,(2)
pii = (pi − ci)(li − xi).(3)
Maximizing profits with respect to pC and pi leads to
pC =
1
2
[∑n
i=1 pi
n
+
∑n
i=1 di
n
− dC + cC
]
+
1
n
[lC + l (N − n− 1)] ,(4)
pi =
1
2
[pC + dC − di + ci] + li.(5)
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A comparison of the price reaction functions for central and remote firms reveals three
effects of centrality on firms’ pricing decisions.
Proposition 1. Centrality implies an asymmetry in the firms’ strategic pricing beha-
vior: Firms respond more strongly to price changes by a central firm than to price changes
by a remote firm.
This can easily be verified since ∂pi/∂pC = 1/2 > 1/2n = ∂pC/∂pi, ∀n > 1 and
∂pj/∂pi = 0,∀i 6= j. Figure 1 illustrates that – given the parameter restrictions discussed
above – two remote firms never compete for the same customer. Thus, a price change
by the remote firm i has no direct impact on all other remote firms and will directly
influence one competitor only: the central firm. According to Proposition 1, the optimal
price response of a central firm to a price change by a single remote firm i decreases
with the number of remote firms (n). Consequently, if n is large, a price change by one
remote firm will be of relatively minor importance and will trigger a relatively small price
response. In contrast, the central firm has n direct competitors. A price change by this
firm has a direct impact on all remote firms, which does not depend on the size of n.
Thus, in terms of the influence of one agent on other agents’ actions, the central firm is
indeed the most powerful.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium the price of the central firm exceeds the price charged
by a remote firm if and only if 2
n
[lC + l (N − n− 1)]−3li+l¯i−2dC+ 3di+d¯i2 +cC− 3ci−c¯i2 > 0.
The central position does not necessarily result in a higher equilibrium price compared
to remote firms. Centrality is associated with two characteristics which exert countervai-
ling effects on equilibrium prices: A central firm holds a larger market share than remote
firms, which has a positive impact on its equilibrium price. However, centrality also im-
plies a larger number of direct competitors, which restricts the ability to raise prices. The
‘market share effect’ is likely to dominate the ‘number of rivals effect’ if the number of
empty spokes relative to the number of competitors (N/n) is large, if the central firm is
located close to the center (dC is small), if the central firm has a large ‘hinterland’ (a large
l and lC for a given dC), and if the remote firms are located at a larger distance from the
center (di and d¯i are large). The ‘number of rivals effect’, on the other hand, is stronger
if the number of remote competitors n is large. A formal discussion of this aspect and a
proof of Proposition 2 are provided in the online appendix.
Proposition 3. The indirect impact of a price change of the central firm (following
some idiosyncratic exogenous shock) on equilibrium market prices is stronger than the
indirect impact of the same price change emanating from a remote firm.
This proposition highlights the importance of centrality for the transmission of shocks
on equilibrium market prices. An exogenous shock to firm i will not only directly affect
firm i’s price but will also indirectly affect prices of its neighbors, which again triggers
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price adjustments by the neighbors’ neighbors including feedback effects to station i it-
self. These indirect effects are higher if the price change (following some idiosyncratic
exogenous shock) is induced by a central rather than by a remote firm. A formal proof of
proposition 3 is provided in the online appendix.
3 Industry, Data and Empirical Specification
3.1 The Retail Gasoline Market of Vienna
The retail gasoline market is particularly appropriate for our empirical analysis for several
reasons. First, gasoline is a rather homogeneous product and the main source of product
differentiation is a gasoline station’s location (Barron et al., 2004; Clemenz and Gugler,
2006). Second, we assume in the theoretical model that firm locations are exogenously
given. While this is a simplification, decisions on market entry and location choice are
long-run decisions and can be considered as predetermined to the (short-run) pricing
decision. This perspective is supported by the fact that establishing or closing a gasoline
station is a costly endeavor. Third, the network centrality of gasoline stations is fairly
easy to conceptualize and measure based on their locations within the network of roads.
For the present analysis we use detailed data on the geographical locations and other
characteristics of all 273 gasoline stations in Vienna, which were collected by the company
Experian Catalist in August 2003 (see http://www.catalist.com for company details).
This data set is merged with retail price data for diesel5 collected by the Austrian Chamber
of Labor in the Vienna metropolitan area within one particular day every three months
between October 1999 and March 2005 (a total of 22 points in time). Prices were collected
for a randomly selected sub-sample of stations by telephone or – if a station refused to
pass on information on prices – by driving past the respective station. The number of
price observations available ranges from 144 to 152 per period.6 Retail prices are nominal
and measured in Euro cents per liter. The retail fuel price in Austria is determined by
5Unlike in North America, diesel-engined vehicles are very common in Europe. The share of cars with
diesel engines was more than 50% in Austria in 2005 (Statistik Austria, 2006).
6An econometric analysis of potential determinants for missing prices supports the claim of the Cham-
ber of Labor that stations are picked randomly: While some station characteristics have statistically
significant effects on the probability to observe the price of a station, the marginal effects of each of the
significant variables are extremely small. Further, the degree of centrality does not have a significant
impact on the probability that prices are observed. Thus, we conclude that prices are missing at random
(MAR) (see e.g. Little and Rubin (2002) for a classification). A detailed description of this econometric
exercise is available in the online appendix. The group of randomly preselected stations does not change
much over time: Out of 273 stations located in Vienna prices are observed for all periods for 121 stations,
while prices are not available in any period for 87 stations. Note that missing prices do not affect our
centrality measure which is based on the locations of all 273 gasoline stations.
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three components (Benigni and Prinz, 2005): The first makes up about one third of the
gross price and includes the crude oil price, the refining margin, transportation costs from
the refinery to the station, as well as costs associated with the compulsory emergency
reserves and storage expenses. The second accounts for about 10% of the gross price and
includes station maintenance, advertising and overhead expenses as well as the station’s
mark-up. The final component is made up of an excise fuel tax (28.02 cents per liter until
the end of 2003 and 30.02 cents afterwards) as well as 20% VAT (based on the net price
including the fuel tax). In total, these taxes amount to more than half of the gross diesel
price.
Table 1 illustrates the structure of the retail gasoline market of Vienna in August 2003.
The market consists of branded and unbranded stations. Three major brands account for
more than half (52%) of the 273 gasoline stations. BP (28%) has the largest number of
outlets followed by OMV (13%) and Shell (11%). Six minor brands account for 31% and
17% are unbranded (independent) stations.
[Table 1]
Most branded stations are owned and operated by the company behind the brand
implying that the refiner sets the retail price directly. In some instances company-owned
branded stations are leased to a residual claimant who is obliged to purchase wholesale
gasoline directly from the refiner but is independent in setting the retail price. In the case
of dealer-owned branded stations, the dealer only signs a contract with a branded refiner
to sell its brand of gasoline. Unbranded gasoline stations can shop for the lowest wholesale
price from any refiner and separately determine their retail prices. They charge relatively
low prices but offer few additional amenities such as car washing or service bays. While
the assumption that gasoline stations set prices independently is straightforward for un-
branded gasoline stations, it may not be so for branded stations. The same considerations
apply to dealer-owned versus company-owned stations. However, having applied variance
ratio tests, we do not find a smaller variance among branded stations than among un-
branded stations. Having differentiated between major brands and minor brands, we only
find a slightly smaller variance for the group of major brands compared to unbranded sta-
tions, but no difference between minor brands and unbranded stations. Thus, as all these
differences are very small, we stick to the assumption that price dispersion within brands
is not systematically different from unbranded stations, for which the assumption of inde-
pendent pricing is straightforward. A variance ratio test for the prices of company- and
dealer-owned stations does not reveal significant differences between these two groups.7
7A detailed description of differences in the within-variance of prices for branded and unbranded,
company- and dealer-owned stations is available in the online appendix.
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While these results do not preclude that some brands (company-owned stations) charge
systematically different prices, the findings indicate that branded (company-owned) sta-
tions’ price setting decisions take local market characteristics into consideration similarly
to independent retailers.
To explore the importance of price fluctuations over time as well as permanent and
random price movements within time periods we estimate a simple two-way fixed effects
model of prices on station and time fixed effects (without any additional controls). Alt-
hough we do not observe extreme price hikes over the sample period, fixed time effects
account for nearly 90% of the overall price dispersion. Station-level fixed effects capture
roughly 50% of the remaining cross-sectional price variation. Detailed results are available
in the online appendix. To further investigate the stability of the price distribution over
time we compute an index of rank reversal from comparing prices of all pairs of stations in
a local market. Irrespective of the specific procedure used to define neighbors we observe
that on average the usually cheaper station charges a lower price than its neighboring
station in roughly 90%.8 All of these figures show that the permanent part of the cross-
sectional price variation plays an important role and that differences in relative prices are
not purely random.9
Data on prices are merged with data on the geographical locations and other cha-
racteristics of all 273 gasoline stations in Vienna. Using ArcGIS Austria and the tool
WIGeoNetwork, we link the geographical location of each gasoline station to information
on the Viennese road system, wich allows us to generate accurate measures of distance
(measured in driving time) as well as the centrality of gasoline stations in the road net-
work (see Section 3.2). The distance to the nearest neighbor (DISTANCE NEXT) is
used as a proxy for the effect of the degree of spatial differentiation on price levels. To
approximate demand and cost differences at different locations, we include variables on
population density (POP DENS) as published by the Austrian Statistical Office, and on
prices for factory and business premises (PREMISES) at the level of 23 districts collected
by the Austrian Chamber of Labor for 2001, the share of commuters among all potential
consumers (COMMUTERS)10 as well as a dummy variable (TRAFFIC) that indicates
heavy traffic intensity at the site of a gasoline station according to the Experian Catalist
8Similar degrees of rank reversals are found by Chandra and Tappata (2011). Summary statistics on rank
reversals for the whole period and sub-periods are available in the online appendix.
9These numbers, however, also indicate that there is a substantial part of price variation that cannot be
explained by (observed or unobserved) station and location heterogeneity. Theoretically, the unexplained
part of the price variation can be rationalized by search-theoretic models with consumers being differently
well-informed about prices, so-called ‘clearinghouse models’ (Varian, 1980; Stahl, 1989), or by dynamic
pricing games as proposed by Maskin and Tirole (1988) that can lead to Edgeworth price cycles.
10A detailled description of this variable is provided in the online appendix.
8
data.11 A number of dummy variables are included to account for additional station cha-
racteristics. Prices can be expected to be different if a station is company- rather than
dealer-owned (COMPANY). Stations offering attendance service usually charge higher
prices, as well as large stations which may increase the customers’ willingness to pay by
offering more comfort and ensuring less risk of congestion. Thus, the dummy variable
SERVICE (LARGE) is equal to one if a station offers attendance service (if a station’s
ground surface is more than 2, 000 square meters) and is zero otherwise. Table 2 in Section
3.2 summarizes all of these variables. Our estimations further include dummy variables
for each of the nine brands illustrated in Table 1 as well as time fixed effects.
3.2 Measuring Centrality
The fact that the spatial structure of gasoline stations can be more complex than suggested
by Figure 1 (as for instance, several stations can be located along a particular road) makes
it difficult to measure centrality properly. A clear-cut dichotomy between central and
remote competitors thus appears inappropriate for an empirical analysis. Rather, the
spatial structure of gasoline stations is characterized by different ‘degrees’ of centrality
within the network of roads. In order to calculate the centrality of gasoline stations,
the network of roads, intersections and gasoline stations has to be transformed into a
network whose only nodes are gasoline stations, whereby the links between these nodes
reflect neighborhood relations relevant for strategic interaction. Let G of dimensionm×m
reflect a network of m nodes. In G a link gij = 1 if j is among the H-nearest neighbors
of i in terms of driving time, while gij = 0 otherwise. In the following, we borrow the
measure ‘degree centrality’, introduced by Freeman (1979), which is frequently used in
the social network literature (see e.g. Jackson, 2008). In our case it measures the number
of times a particular gasoline station is among the H nearest neighbors of other gasoline
stations. The degree centrality (dc) of gasoline station j in networkG based on H-nearest
neighborhood is given by12
(6) dcHj =
m∑
i=1
gij,
For our main specifications we set H = 5 but we also experiment with H = 2 and
11The data contain four categories of traffic levels (very heavy, heavy, medium, low) that each station is
assigned to by the surveyors. TRAFFIC is equal to one if traffic is considered to be (very) heavy and
is zero otherwise.
12As relations are not necessarily reciprocal – i is not necessarily among the H-nearest neighbors of j if j
is among the H-nearest neighbors of i – each node has the same number of H out-degrees (the number
of links emanating from each node) but the network is directed. Therefore, our centrality measure is
based on a node’s in-degree (the number of links leading to a node).
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H = 10. More details on these and other centrality measures (used to check the robustness
of our results with respect to different concepts of centrality) and a numerical example
for a stylized network are provided in the online appendix. Table 2 shows descriptive
statistics for the main centrality measure as well as for all other variables used in the
empirical model.13
[Table 2]
3.3 Model Specification and Estimation Method
Our theoretical analysis suggests that centrality influences both, the level of prices as well
as the strategic interaction in pricing between competitors. The empirical specification of
the model that accounts for both effects is given by the following spatial autoregressive
model
(7) p = ρ1Wp+ ρ2WCp+Xβ + γCι+ .
In equation (7) p is theM×1 vector of prices, whereM is the total number of observations
in a repeated cross section of T = 22 periods, so that M =
T∑
t=1
mt, with mt being the
number of observations in period t. The matricesW and C are block diagonal (T blocks)
and of dimension M ×M . W is the spatial weights (distance decay) matrix with element
wij being the squared inverse of the driving time from station i to station j, if station j is
within a critical driving time (5 minutes) from i and i 6= j, and wij = 0 otherwise.14 C is
a diagonal matrix with the main diagonal element cjj measuring the degree of centrality
of station j. X is an M × k matrix of k explanatory variables including a constant, ι
is an M × 1 unit vector, and  is the M × 1 vector of error terms. ρ1 and ρ2 are the
coefficients of spatial autocorrelation, β is the k×1 vector of coefficients of the exogenous
variables in X, and γ measures the partial correlation between centrality and a station’s
13Centrality is positively correlated with company ownership, stations’ size, heavy traffic and major
brands, and negatively correlated with the driving time to the nearest neighbor, population density,
and unbranded stations. However, the coefficients of correlation between the centrality measure and
these other variables are rather small. We also tested for differences in the spatial distribution of several
station characteristics within the market. The mean degree of centrality and the share of major branded
stations do not deviate significantly from the whole market in any of the sub-regions we analyzed. More
details are available in the online appendix.
14The spatial weights reflect the elasticity of substitution and we expect this elasticity to depend on
driving time rather than driving distance. However, substitution patterns might also be influenced by
other determinants. Houde (2012) puts forward the idea that commuting patterns influence substitution
elasticities. Pennerstorfer et al. (2014) use commuting patterns to delimit local markets. We refrain
from doing so as our data on commuting is not very accurate for commuters residing or working in
Vienna (see the online appendix for details).
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price level. The matrices W and WC are row-normalized. Row-normalization implies
that the influence of a station (i) on a rival station’s (j) price (∂pj/∂pi) decreases with the
number of competitors. This is plausible for a number of reasons: First, in the theoretical
model row-normalization is suggested by the fact that ∂pC/∂pi = 1/(2n). Second, in
a field experiment Barron et al. (2008) show that in a retail gasoline market stations
respond less to a (exogenous) price change of an individual ‘treated’ gasoline station if
the number of stations in the local market is high. Third, row-normalization facilitates
the interpretation of the spatial autoregressive parameter ρ1 (ρ2), as Wp (WCp) is the
spatially weighted (spatially and centrality-weighted) average price of rivals. To account
for unobserved spatial heterogeneity we allow the error term  to be spatially correlated
so that  = λW error+υ (or, equivalently,  = (I−λW error)−1υ), where I is an M ×M
identity matrix. InW error element werrorij = 1 if station i and j are within the same local
market (within 5 minutes’ driving time) and i 6= j, and zero otherwise. TheM×M matrix
W error is again block diagonal with T = 22 blocks and is row-normalized to calculate the
average residuals  of other nearby stations. In W error we opt for binary rather than
distance-based weights because unobserved local characteristics or shocks are expected to
affect all firms within a local market equally. We follow a referee’s suggestion and cluster
the remaining error υ at the station level to account for serial correlation.
By definition, the spatial averages of rivals’ prices on the right-hand side of the price
reaction function in equation (7) are endogenous. Therefore, OLS will lead to biased and
inconsistent parameter estimates, unless ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 (Anselin, 1988). Two alternative
approaches to solve this problem are frequently used in the applied spatial economics
literature: First, an estimation of the reduced form of a spatial system of equations
applying maximum likelihood (ML) techniques; second, the use of instrumental variables
(IV) or similar concepts such as the generalized method of moments (GMM).
In the ML-approach – as proposed by Anselin (1988) and Case (1991) – the reduced
form of equation (7) is equal to
p = (I − ρ1W − ρ2WC)−1 (Xβ + γCι+ ) .(8)
It is important to note that the structural model in (7) can be recovered by estimating
this reduced form model based on equilibrium prices.15 In section 4 we will present results
based on ML estimation first, as this method is most commonly used in empirical research
applying spatial econometric techniques (Gibbons and Overman, 2012). Lee (2004) shows
15In the online appendix we use simulated data based on our stylized theoretical model to show that
recovering ρ1 and ρ2 is possible when using data on equilibrium prices, as long as the model is correctly
specified.
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that (quasi-) ML estimators are consistent and asymptotically efficient, as long as some
regularity conditions are met.
However, ML-based methods have recently been criticized because the properties of the
estimator(s) are based on prior knowledge of the data-generating process which is unusual
in empirical work (Gibbons and Overman, 2012). Using instrumental variables (IV) allows
for an estimation of the structural equation in (7) directly. Most researchers using IV
estimation in a spatial setting, e.g. Pinkse et al. (2002), follow Kelejian and Prucha
(1998, 1999) and use spatial lags of (some of the) exogenous variables as instruments,
such that prices of nearby competitors are instrumented by their own characteristics.
More specifically, Kelejian and Prucha (1998) propose a three-step procedure: First, a
two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator is used to obtain consistent estimates for ρ1,
ρ2, β and γ. In this step WX˜ and WCdcX˜ are used as instruments excluded from
the second stage regression, with X˜ containing all variables (including Cdcι) that vary
at the station level. The spatial process in the residuals can be ignored in this step, as
only consistent (and not efficient) estimators of the coefficients are necessary. Second, the
autoregressive parameter λ is estimated with a generalized moments procedure suggested
in Kelejian and Prucha (1999), using the residuals obtained in the first step.16 In the third
step the estimator of λ (λ˜) is used to perform a Cochrane-Orcutt type transformation to
account for spatial correlation.17 The transformed model is finally estimated by a GMM
estimator usingWX˜,WCdcX˜,W errorX̂,W errorWX˜ andW errorWCdcX˜ as excluded
instruments – as proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) – with X̂ including all variables
with cross-sectional variation. This procedure – which we denote as a generalized spatial
(GS)2SLS/GMM estimator – allows us to estimate exactly the same model (including
spatial autoregressive processes both in the endogenous variable and in the disturbance
term) as in the ML-specifications. In our application the observed firm characteristics are
mainly dummy variables and their spatially lagged averages might thus be relatively weak
instruments. However, this method addresses issues of identification directly and does not
rely on the assumption of normally distributed residuals. To increase the credibility of our
findings we therefore use both ML- and IV-based estimation procedures as recommended
by McMillen (2012).
16Note that Kelejian and Prucha (1998) derive a point estimate for λ, but no standard deviation for the
estimated parameter.
17Applying this transformation gives the equation p∗ = ρ1Wp∗ + ρ2WCdcp∗ + X∗β + γCdcι∗ + υ
to be estimated, with p∗ = p − λ˜W errorp, Wp∗ = Wp − λ˜W errorWp, WCdcp∗ = WCdcp −
λ˜W errorWCdcp, X∗ =X − λ˜W errorX, and Cdcι∗ = Cdcι− λ˜W errorCdcι.
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3.4 Identification Issues and Interpretation
Ideally, one could follow Pinkse et al. (2002) and Pinkse and Slade (2010), among others,
and interpret the system of equations in (7) as a set of reaction functions obtained from
a simultaneous pricing game. In this case the parameter estimate of ρ1 measures the
(spatially weighted) price interaction between neighboring stations. An asymmetry in
price adjustment between central and remote firms is then captured by ρ2. A positive
estimate of ρ2 would indicate that prices respond more strongly to price changes by more
central stations, as suggested by Proposition 1.
However, the identification of strategic pricing interaction between (neighboring) firms
in both equations (7) and (8) is impeded (i) by an incomplete data sample, (ii) by the
existence of a common time-varying price component, and (iii) by spatially correlated
unobservable determinants of gasoline prices. Additionally, disentangling the influence of
rivaling stations’ prices from the impact of other stations’ characteristics (the so-called
‘reflection problem’, see Manski, 1993) is a further challenge.
First, as our sample of prices is incomplete (prices are unavailable for nearly half of all
observations),Wp andWCp are based on a sub-sample of neighboring stations if prices
are not observed for all other stations in the vicinity at a particular point in time. The
average price of a sub-sample of rivals stations, however, will most likely differ from the
average of all rivals in a local market. As noted by Pinkse and Slade (2010, p. 113) “[t]here
is not much work offering a serious solution to this problem”. In this paper we ignore
stations in the vicinity for which prices are unavailable (listwise deletion). For the ML-
estimator and randomly missing dependent variables Wang and Lee (2013) show that the
bias of the spatial autoregressive parameter (ρ) is rather small and decreases with sample
size if all observations with missing dependent variables are excluded from the analysis.
For IV-estimators small sample results of the consequences of listwise deletion are not
available, but Kelejian and Prucha (2010) show that a two-stage least squares IV estimator
remains asymptotically consistent if observations with missing endogenous variables are
dropped from the analysis, as long as the share of missing endogenous variables does not
get too large. While missing information on prices is expected to reduce the efficiency of
the parameter estimates, we are confident that they remain consistent and that potential
biases are negligibly small.18
Second, fluctuations in gasoline prices over time typically account for a large share
of the total price variation. Even if there was perfect competition, prices of neighbo-
18In contrast to prices, information on the explanatory variables is nearly complete (see Table 2). As the
data are missing (completely) at random and the share of missing data is very small, we follow Greene
(2008) and replace missing information with zeros in the estimations while including dummy variables
that are equal to one if the information is missing for an observation, and zero otherwise.
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ring stations would still be correlated because of this common time-varying component.19
Thus, we include time fixed effects which completely remove price fluctuations common
to all gasoline stations. Any remaining correlation between prices of neighboring stations
cannot be driven by common exogenous shocks.
Third, it is generally difficult to identify whether (or to what extent) the correlation
between the price of a particular station is caused by other stations’ prices or (a) by
unobserved local characteristics or common local market shocks or (b) by rival stations’
characteristics directly rather than indirectly via rival stations’ prices. To address (a),
which might also violate the assumption of i.i.d. errors, we allow the error term to be
spatially correlated.20 If the model (in particular the spatial weights matrices) is specified
correctly, it is possible to disentangle the causal effects of one station’s price on other
stations’ prices from the (potential) influence of unobserved local characteristics. However,
while we provide arguments for our preferred model specification, the choice of the spatial
weights matrices has to be based on assumptions that cannot be tested.
(b) The so-called ‘reflection problem’, i.e. whether p is affected by (Wp,WCp)
or directly by (WX,WCX), is outlined in Manski (1993) and thoroughly discussed
in Pinkse and Slade (2010) and Gibbons and Overman (2012). We think that for the
explanation of the price charged by a particular station, rival stations’ prices play a do-
minant role compared to other stations’ characteristics, as including (WX˜,WCX˜) in
the maximum likelihood estimation hardly affects the parameter estimates of ρ1 and ρ2
(see specification [2] and [3] in Table 3). Additionally, when performing IV-regressions
we use (WX˜,WCX˜) as excluded instruments (see specification [3] in Table 3). In this
case a Hansen J-test indicates that these spatially lagged characteristics are valid instru-
ments and therefore correctly excluded from the main regression. However, disentangling
the effect of rival stations’ prices from the direct impact of rival stations’ characteristics
requires the spatial weights matrix W , capturing the structure of the ‘reference groups’
(i.e. market boundaries and functional form of distance decay), to be known a-priori.
Again, the specification of the weights matrix is based on assumptions that cannot be
fully tested.
Despite the efforts to address these identification challenges we cannot provide experi-
mental evidence by (exogenously) shocking the network at various points. Alternatively,
a fully-specified demand system would be necessary for identifying the causal effects of
one station’s price on rival prices. However, this would require quantity data, which are
19This aspect is also visible in the data: The correlation between prices and spatially weighted (spatially
and centrality weighted) average prices of rival firms is approximately 0.97. Once common time effects
are controlled for the correlation decreases to about 0.67. See the online appendix for further details.
20See Section 3.3. A spatial autoregressive process in the residuals is preferred over clustering the residuals
at a local level, as clustering restricts local markets to non-overlapping spatial units.
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not available in the present context.21 We therefore refrain from interpreting the para-
meter estimates of ρ1 and ρ2 as measuring the causal effects between stations’ prices.
Nevertheless, even in a descriptive fashion our results highlight the importance of taking
the complex geography of the market into account when analyzing prices in spatially
differentiated markets.
4 Results
From the theoretical model we expect – once we include the spatially and centrality
weighted average price, WCp – ρ2 to be positive and statistically significant, while ρ1 is
not significantly different from zero (Proposition 1). Due to countervailing effects of the
degree of centrality on prices (‘market share’ vs. ‘number of rivals’ effect) we have no clear
expectations as to the relation between centrality and price levels γ (Proposition 2). The
question whether a price shock induced by a firm with a higher degree of centrality has a
stronger effect on equilibrium prices (Proposition 3), is treated in a simulation experiment
in Section 4.2 after discussing the regression results in Section 4.1. A sensitivity analysis
of the econometric results is discussed in Section 4.3.
4.1 Econometric Results
The main econometric results are summarized in Table 3. The parameter estimates of
a benchmark model (which does not explicitly control for differences in centrality by
assuming ρ2 = 0 and γ = 0) are reported in column [1]. Similar to previous studies
estimating spatial lags for retail gasoline prices (Netz and Taylor, 2002; Pennerstorfer,
2009), we find a positive parameter estimate of ρ1. The parameter is significantly different
from zero at the 1%-level. A (spatially weighted) average price increase by 1 cent by all
relevant neighbors is associated with a price increase by 0.45 cents per liter.
[Table 3]
Columns [2] to [4] report parameter estimates of the extended model including the
centrality measure defined above. Centrality is found to significantly contribute to ex-
plaining the spatial correlation of prices. The parameter estimates of ρ2 are positive and
21A different approach is taken by Thomadsen (2005). Following the seminal work of Feenstra and
Levinsohn (1995), the author accommodates the lack of quantity data by using information obtained
from the assumption of consumer utility maximizing behavior. Thomadsen (2005) substitutes the
relationship between price and quantity (obtained from consumer demand) into the firms’ first-order
conditions from static Bertrand competition to jointly estimate the parameters of the indirect utility
functions of consumers and the marginal costs of firms.
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significantly different from zero at the 1%-level, while ρ1 is not significantly different from
zero in all specifications that includeWCp. A particular gasoline station’s price is more
strongly related to prices of a central competitor than to prices of a remote rival. This
is in line with Proposition 1. Further, the inclusion of centrality significantly improves
the explanatory power of the models: a likelihood ratio (LR)-test clearly rejects the ‘re-
stricted’ model [1] in favor of the ML-models including degree centrality (models [2], [3])
at the 1% significance level. Column [3] extends model [2] by including spatially lagged
exogenous variables (WX˜ and WCX˜), as neighboring stations’ characteristics might
affect prices directly – and not only indirectly – by altering neighboring stations’ prices.
The parameter estimates of ρ1 and ρ2 are hardly affected by this alteration: In model [3]
ρ1 (ρ2) is again insignificant (significant and positive). The difference between the point
estimates of ρ2 in [2] and [3] is small and not statistically different from zero. The results
are also hardly affected when applying an IV-based method (GS2SLS/GMM), reported in
column [4]. The point estimate of ρ2 is very similar to model [2] and [3] and statistically
not different from them, while ρ1 remains insignificant. As expected, the standard errors
of ρ1 and ρ2 are somewhat larger in the IV-model. Table 3 also provides specification
tests for the IV-estimates: A Hansen J-test for the overidentification restrictions does not
reject the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals.
This suggests that the excluded instruments are valid instruments and are therefore cor-
rectly excluded from the second-stage regression. F -tests to assess the explanatory power
of the exogenous variables excluded from the second-stage regression in both first-stage
regressions (on Wp and WCdcp) reject the null hypothesis of no explanatory power
at the 1%-significance level for both endogenous variables. To sum up, the instruments
appear to be valid and strong enough to strengthen our confidence in our findings.
The two countervailing effects (‘market share’ vs. ‘number of rivals’ effect) associated
with centrality that follow from the theoretical model (Proposition 2) seem to balance each
other on average. The parameter estimate of DEGREE (dc) centrality is not significantly
different from zero. Thus, we do not find evidence that centrality explains differences in
the price levels.22
Our models include a number of control variables, as discussed in Section 3.1. An
increase in the distance to the nearest neighbor (DISTANCE NEXT) by one minute is
associated with an increase in the price of a station by about 0.2 cents. An increase in
the rate of COMMUTERS by ten percentage points is related to an increase in prices by
0.2 to 0.4 cents. The results for both variables are highly significant in all specifications.
The local population density (POPDENS) is significantly larger than zero only in the
22The lack of significance might also stem from the fact that the empirical model directly controls for
differences in consumer demand through the included location characteristics.
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IV-specification [4], while the price for PREMISES is significantly positively correlated
with fuel prices in two specifications ([3] and [4]). Company- rather than dealer-owned
stations (COMPANY = 1) are found to charge significantly higher prices by about 0.8 to
1.1 cents per liter at least at the 10% significance level in all specifications. In contrast,
LARGE stations (> 2, 000m2 of surface area) do not significantly charge more than smal-
ler stations. We find some evidence for higher gasoline prices at stations located at roads
with heavy TRAFFIC, but the effect is significantly different from zero only in specifica-
tion [3]. Stations offering attendance SERVICE charge higher prices by about 0.7 cents
compared to stations exclusively offering self-service. The three major brands operating
in Austria (BP, OMV and SHELL) charge significantly higher prices than unbranded
stations. According to column [2], the price differences range from 1.5 cents (OMV and
SHELL) to 1.9 cents (BP). The price differences between minor brands and independent
(unbranded) stations are more heterogeneous: Some minor brands (AGIP, ARAL and
ESSO) charge prices similar to major brands, while the price differences between some
other minor brands (AVANTI, JET and STROH) and unbranded stations are not signi-
ficantly different from zero. All of these results are in line with previous findings on the
determinants of station level gasoline prices.
The parameter estimates for the coefficient of spatial autocorrelation in the residuals
(λ) are significantly different from zero in all three ML-models. Including WX˜ and
WCX˜ as additional control variables in column [3], however, reduces λ, from around
0.4 to 0.2. These results clearly reject the assumption of spatially uncorrelated residuals
and justify our approach of modeling a spatial autoregressive process in the error term.
Surprisingly, λ takes a negative sign in the IV-model [4].
4.2 Simulation
If equation (7) could be interpreted as a set of reaction functions, then it is important to
note that the parameter estimates of ρ1 and ρ2 only account for the direct relation between
prices of neighboring stations. To illustrate this point and to address the third proposition
of our theoretical model, i.e. the effect of centrality on the transmission of shocks to the
general price level, we need to consider that each price change also triggers feedback
effects to and from all neighbors in the market. Starting with equilibrium prices, an
exogenous idiosyncratic shock for a particular station i will not only change i’s own price
(direct effect) but also the prices of its (first-order) neighbors, which again triggers price
adjustments by the neighbors’ neighbors (second-order neighbors of station i) including
feedback effects to station i itself (indirect effect). To calculate differences in the total
effect of idiosyncratic, station-specific shocks on equilibrium prices, we use the estimates
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of ρ1 and ρ2 from specification [2] in Table 3 and apply a bootstrap simulation technique
in which each parameter is drawn randomly from a normal distribution with the mean
and the standard deviation obtained from this regression.23 Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the
relationship between centrality and the transmission of shocks via indirect neighborhood
effects. More specifically, in Figure 2 the relative impact of the indirect (feedback) effects
of an idiosyncratic exogenous shock emanating from one gasoline station on this particular
station is measured by the ratio of the total effect (including the direct impact as well
as all indirect effects) to the direct effect. This ratio is shown on the vertical axis on the
left-hand side of Figure 2. The centrality of the station inducing the shock is measured on
the horizontal axis, the density of the different degrees of centrality of gasoline stations
in the market is measured on the vertical axis on the right. According to Figure 2, an
exogenous shock triggering a direct price increase by 1 cent for an individual station with
a median degree centrality of 5 leads to an additional (indirect) increase in its price (after
considering all feedback effects to and from neighboring firms) by 4 %. Thus, the total
price increase at this station is 1.04 cents per liter. In contrast, the total price increase
is not significantly different from the direct increase in case of a remote supplier with
a degree centrality of 2, being 1.11 cents per liter for a central suplier with a degree
centrality of 11.
[Figure 2]
[Figure 3]
Similarly, Figure 3 illustrates the aggregated increase in prices of all other gasoline
stations in the market due to indirect feedback effects following an idiosyncratic shock
induced by an individual gasoline station. The horizontal axis again measures the ‘degree
centrality’ of the station inducing the shock and the vertical axis on the right again
illustrates the distribution of degrees of centrality of gasoline stations in the market. The
vertical axis on the left now measures the aggregated (sum of) indirect effects on all other
gasoline stations in the market excluding the station inducing the shock. Figure 3 shows
that an idiosyncratic shock emanating from a gasoline station with a degree centrality of
5 (11) triggering a price increase by 1 cent at this station, leads to an aggregated increase
in prices of all other stations in the market by 0.52 (2.55) cents. The same shock induced
by a remote gasoline station with a ‘degree centrality’ of 2, however, does not lead to an
aggregated increase significantly different from zero in the price of other stations. Gasoline
stations with a higher degree of centrality tend to be neighbors to more stations, to be
23In the simulations we normalize ρ1 and ρ2 so that they sum up to the value of ρ1 obtained in the
benchmark model of specification [1] for each draw. This assumption is justified as we cannot reject
the restriction of ρ1 in specification [1] being equal to ρ1 + ρ2 in specification [2].
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relatively closer to other stations, and are thus more influential in affecting the prices
of neighboring stations. The results of this simulation show that the indirect impact of
a price increase induced by a firm on equilibrium prices is positively correlated with its
degree of centrality, and therefore support Proposition 3.
4.3 Robustness Checks
In order to confirm that the results are not driven by the specific definitions of key
variables used in our empirical analysis, the regressions were run using perturbations
of these definitions. In a first set of estimation experiments we use different concepts
of centrality (‘weighted degree’ and ‘closeness’ centrality), different neighborhood criteria
determining a station’s centrality (H = 2 andH = 10 instead ofH = 5) as well as different
specifications of the spatial weights matrixW such as the (cubed) inverse rather than the
squared inverse distance. Secondly, to show that the degree of spatial autocorrelation in
prices is related to station centrality and not to other factors (correlated with our centrality
measures), we interact the spatial weights matrix with several station characteristics and
with interaction terms of various explanatory variables. Thirdly, we also include district-
fixed effects instead of variables that vary only at the district level to control for additional
potentially unobserved regional heterogeneity. Fourthly, we analyze the residuals of a
two-way fixed effects model (including station level and time period fixed effects only),
denoted as ‘residual’ or ‘cleaned’ prices, instead of ‘raw’ prices, to control for all time
invariant station and location characteristics. We then investigate whether these residual
prices are correlated with spatially and centrality weigthed residual prices. Further, we
test alternative specifications of the IV estimator that model different forms of spatially
clustered errors instead of spatially autocorrelated residuals. Finally, we excludeWp and
WCp from the regression to investigate whether the importance of centrality is picked
up by WCX˜, once Wp and WCp are left out.
A thorough description of these robustness checks as well as a detailed discussion of
their results is available in the online appendix. All of the results support the findings
presented in Section 4.1: The parameter estimate of ρ2 is positive and significantly diffe-
rent from zero in all models, which suggests that firms’ prices are more strongly correlated
with prices of nearby firms characterized by a higher degree of centrality (as predicted by
Proposition 1). We do not find a statistically significant relation between centrality and
price levels, which is in line with Proposition 2. Simulating the impact of an exogenous
shock by a single firm – based on parameter estimates obtained from alternative models
– provides very similar results as those summarized in Figures 2 and 3 and supports the
prediction of Proposition 3: price changes of firms with a high degree centrality have a lar-
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ger impact on rivals’ (equilibrium) prices. Using different neighborhood criteria, different
concepts to determine centrality, alternative functional forms inW , additional interaction
terms as endogenous spatial lags as well as different estimation procedures does not affect
the main conclusion of our analysis: pricing is significantly related to gasoline stations’
centrality.
5 Conclusions
The present paper highlights the importance of centrality for pricing. Firms are charac-
terized by different degrees of centrality within a network unfolded in space. The specific
position of a firm in the network (its degree of centrality) relative to its competitors de-
termines the intensity of competition between firms. According to our theoretical model
central suppliers are found to be more powerful in the sense of (a) exerting a stronger
influence on the pricing decisions of their neighbors, and (b) having a stronger impact on
equilibrium market prices.
We provide first empirical evidence on the relation between centrality and pricing in
a spatially differentiated market by adopting a measure of centrality from the literature
on (social) networks. Econometric results based on spatial autoregressive models confirm
that prices of a particular gasoline station are more strongly correlated with prices of a
central competitor compared to those of remote firms. Simulation experiments suggest
that the impact of a price change by an individual gasoline station on equilibrium prices
increases with its degree of centrality. We do not find, however, empirical evidence of a
significant relation between centrality and the level of prices. This result can be explai-
ned by the existence of two countervailing effects: centrality implies a larger number of
consumers (higher prices) but, at the same time, is associated with a larger number of
direct competitors (lower prices).
A major caveat of our empirical part is that we cannot interpret our findings as causal
effects of one station’s centrality on another station’s price, due to a lack of quantity or
(quasi-)experimental data. Extending our analysis along the lines suggested by Thomad-
sen (2005) is left for future research. Still, our contribution highlights the importance of
taking into account the complex geographical reality in many spatially differentiated mar-
kets. Therefore, our results have a number of important implications for both economic
policy and academic research: First, gasoline stations are often members of a network of
multi-station firms (large chains of gasoline stations) coordinating their pricing behavior
within the network. The effects of joint ownership or mergers between firms will depend
on the specific geographic positions of the gasoline stations involved. Coordination of
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prices among a number of remote gasoline stations will have different effects on social
welfare than price coordination among central stations.
Second, papers analyzing Edgeworth price cycles find that larger firms (Noel, 2007)
or certain major brands (Lewis, 2012) are more likely to initiate ‘price restorations’ (i.e.
sharp price increases), while price reductions are primarily started off by small firms
(Noel, 2007). It would be interesting to explore the relationship between centrality and
price leadership. Similarly, a number of studies observe that retail gasoline prices adjust
significantly faster to an increase than to a decrease in wholesale prices. Verlinda (2008)
finds that this asymmetry is higher for branded stations and increases with the geographic
distance to rivals as well as with the provision of additional amenities. Further research
could thus focus on relating this literature to stations’ centrality.
Finally, the present paper also underlines the need to analyze entry and exit decisions
in the context of centrality. In contrast to traditional spatial models, in which firms and
consumers are distributed symmetrically and the specific location of a firm in space is
irrelevant, locational choice in space constitutes an important strategic decision in the
present framework. Entry at a central location will have a strong impact on incumbents
since, for many of them, it creates additional direct competition for customers. Entry at
a remote position, however, will have a minor effect on few incumbents only. We hope
that our contribution spurs further research in these directions.
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Figure 1: A stylized network of firms
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Figure 2: The impact of a price shock on the initiator by centrality
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Figure 3: The impact of a price shock on other stations by centrality
27
Table 1: Gasoline stations in Vienna by Brand
Brand Outlets in %
BP 76 27.8%
OMV 35 12.8%
SHELL 30 11.0%
Major Brands 141 51.7%
ESSO 23 8.4%
AVANTI 21 7.7%
AGIP 18 6.6%
STROH 11 4.0%
JET 10 3.7%
ARAL 2 0.7%
Minor Brands 85 31.1%
Unbranded 47 17.2%
Total 273 100.0%
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